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Abstract
Competitive situations that involve cognitive performance are widespread in
labor markets, schools, and organizations, including test taking, competition for
promotion in firms, and others. This paper studies cognitive performance in a
high-stakes competitive environment. The analysis takes advantage of a natural
experiment that randomly allocates different emotional states across professional
subjects competing in a cognitive task. The setting is a chess match where two
players play an even number of chess games against each other alternating the color
of the pieces. White pieces confer an advantage for winning a chess game and who
starts the match with these pieces is randomly decided. The theoretical analysis
shows that in this setting there is no rational reason why winning frequencies
should be better than 50-50 in favor of the player drawing the white pieces in the
first game. Yet, we find that observed frequencies are about 60-40. Differences in
performance are also stronger when the competing subjects are more similar in
cognitive skills. We conclude that the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis
that psychological elements affect cognitive performance in the face of experience,
competition, and high stakes.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, economists have paid considerable attention to the relationship between
perceptions and reasoning, and to emotions such as loss aversion, reference points,
disappointment and others. There is evidence that these and other behavioral effects
are in fact important for explaining a wide range of economic and social behavior. 1
Despite their potential importance, however, little is known about the relevance of
these effects on cognitive performance. Do they exist? If so, do they persist in the face
of experience, competition, and high stakes? These are the questions we study in this
paper.
Understanding cognition is important. Numerous studies establish that measured
cognitive ability is a strong predictor of occupational attainment, wages, and a range
of social behaviors in adults, and several studies document its importance in predicting
the schooling performance of children and adolescents.2 An emerging body of literature
also finds that “psychic” costs explain a range of economic and social behavior (see,
e.g., Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003), Carneiro and Heckman (2003), Cunha,
Heckman and Navarro (2005), Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2006)). Besides social and
economic outcomes, recent research shows that cognitive ability is also important for
financial market outcomes.3 Thus, numerous settings represent competitive situations
that involve cognitive performance (e.g., test taking, student competition in schools,
competitions for promotion in certain firms and organizations, and others), and under-
standing the relationship between cognitive performance and psychological effects is an
important question in the literature on human capital, schooling, behavioral economics
and others.
This paper contributes to these strands of economics literature by studying the im-
pact of psychological differences on cognitive performance in a competitive environment.
The analysis benefits from the opportunity provided by a randomized natural exper-
iment that, in effect, exogenously assigns different emotional states across subjects.
Similar natural experiments to the one we study have been used to examine the role of
psychological effects when subjects perform non-cognitive tasks, and this paper extends
1Rabin (1998), Camerer (2003) and DellaVigna (2009) provide excellent surveys.
2See, for instance, Neal and Johnson (1996), McArdle, Smith and Willis (2009), and other references
therein. Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua (2006) review this literature and present an analysis of the effects
of both cognitive and noncognitive skills on wages. They show that a model with one latent cognitive
skill and one latent noncognitive skill explains a large array of diverse behaviors including schooling,
work experience, occupational choice, and participation in various adolescent risky behaviors.
3See, for instance, Agarwal and Mazumder (2013), Bertrand and Morse (2011), Gerardi, Goette and
Meier (2010), and Cole and Shastry (2009).
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the analysis to study their impact on the performance in cognitive tasks. As such, and
to the best of our knowledge, it represents the first study that evaluates the causal
link from behavioral effects to cognitive performance in a competitive setting taking
advantage of a natural experiment.
The randomized experiment comes from professional sports. Important elements
of human behavior are starkly observable in these settings. As Rosen and Sanderson
(2001) indicate, “if one of the attractions of sports is to see occasionally universal as-
pects of the human struggle in stark and dramatic forms, their attraction to economists
is to illustrate universal economic principles in interesting and tractable ways.” Thus,
not surprisingly, a number of prominent findings in economics have been documented
for the first time studying sports settings. For instance, without attempting to be
exhaustive, Ehrenberg and Bognano (1990) investigate incentive effects in golf tourna-
ments, Szymanski (2000) studies discrimination using soccer data, Garicano et al (2006)
study social pressure as a determinant of corruption in a soccer setting, and Bhaskar
(2009) and Romer (2006) analyze optimal decision-making using cricket and football
data respectively.
Much like these sports settings, ours represents a valuable opportunity for studying
an open question in the literature for a number of reasons:
First, the situation involves a tractable number of subjects (just two) competing at
a game that is considered the ultimate cognitive sport (chess). The game they play has
complete information and involves no chance elements. The game is strictly competitive
or zero-sum. Pure conflict situations in which one person’s gain is always identical to
another’s loss involve no potential elements of cooperation. As such they represent the
cleanest possible context to study competitive behavior. Subjects compete in the same
setting and under identical circumstances and, as we will see in the next section, the
only difference is the randomly determined order in which they complete a task.
Second, and most importantly, we take advantage of existing results in the literature
(to be discussed below) that show that the order of competition generates differences
in emotional states. Using the same type of randomly assigned treatment and control
of these emotional states we extend existing research to the study of performance on
cognitive tasks in a competitive environment.4
Third, the setting involves professional subjects who are characterized by the highest
degree of cognitive skills at the specific competitive task they perform as professionals
4As is well known, a randomized experiment is a powerful methodology not often available in the
social sciences that ensures that the conditions for causal inference are satisfied (Manski, 1995). There
is also a related literature suggesting that providing relative performance information (a consequence
of the order of competition in our setting) affects performance (Azmat and Iriberri, 2010).
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(playing chess). Thus, we can study if biases exist in the face of experience, competi-
tion and high stakes. This is also important because existing research has found that
individuals with higher cognitive ability demonstrate fewer and less extreme cognitive
biases that may lead to suboptimal behavior.5
Fourth, direct measures of cognitive abilities are often lacking in the literature and
can be measured only indirectly (through their correlation with other variables). The
setting in this paper provides a highly precise measure of the cognitive ability of the
players at the task they perform. In particular, subjects have a rating according to
what is called the “ELO rating method” (see Section 4), and this rating estimates quite
precisely the probability that one player will outperform the other at the cognitive task.
This is a valuable advantage of the empirical setting.
Finally, the study concerns high-stakes decisions that subjects are familiar with,
that really affect them, to which they are used, and that take place in their own real-life
environment. In this sense, it involves a set of useful characteristics in terms of stakes,
familiarity and nature of the environment. And from the perspective of observing and
measuring behavior, a comprehensive dataset is available where choices, outcomes, and
treatments are cleanly measured.
From the theoretical point of view, we also develop rational and behavioral models of
optimal play to interpret the empirical evidence. Importantly, these models will contain
a contribution to the game theoretical literature on repeated interactions and to the
literature on multi-battle contests. In our setting, a match consists in the repeated play
of a given stage game but, differently from standard repeated games, the total payoff
that players obtain may not be a sum or an average of the payoffs in each period. The
existing literature has studied the case of binary outcomes: in each stage game one
player wins and the other loses (see Walker, Wooders and Amir (2011)), but we are
aware of no study with more than two outcomes. The presence of a third outcome (in
our context, win, lose, and tie) brings in the issue of how to chose risk during the match,
which we incorporate into the formal frameworks. This represents a novel aspect with
respect to the literature on multi-battle contests in which strategic risk taking is not a
choice variable (e.g., Konrad and Kovenock (2009)).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the natural exper-
iment and a brief literature review. Section 3 develops formal rational and behavioral
models of the task the subjects undertake. The models allow us to identify the condi-
tions under which we may be able to conclude, using the average treatment effects from
5See, for instance, the recent results in Gill and Prowse (2015). Also, Benjamin, Brown and Shapiro
(2013) and Frederick (2005) report similar findings for high school and college students, respectively,
using different measures of intelligence and cognitive ability.
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the natural experiment, whether behavioral elements have an impact on cognitive per-
formance. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the main empirical evidence,
and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Natural Experiment
In a chess match, two players play an even number of chess games, typically about 6 to
10 games, against each other. Games are generally played one per day, with one or two
rest days during the duration of the match. The basic procedure establishes that the
two players alternate the colors of the pieces with which they play. In the first game,
one player plays with the white pieces and the other with the black pieces. In the second
game, the colors are reversed, and so on. Who plays with the white pieces in the first
game is randomly determined, and this is the only procedural difference between the
two players. According to the rules of FIDE (the Fe´de´ration Internationale d’ E´checs,
the world governing body of chess), the order is decided randomly under the supervision
of a referee. This random draw of colors, which is typically conducted publicly during
the opening ceremony of the match, requires that the player who wins the draw will
play the first game with the white pieces. Therefore, the fact that players have no choice
of order or color of the pieces makes it an ideal randomized experiment for empirically
establishing causality.
The explicit randomization mechanism used to determine which player begins with
the white pieces in a sequence of games where both players have exactly the same
opportunities to play the same number of games with the same colors, have the same
stakes, are in the same setting and where all other circumstances are identical, suggests
that we should expect both players to have, ceteris paribus, exactly the same probability
of winning the match. That is, absent behavioral effects associated with the order of
colors, there is no rational reason why observed winning frequencies should be different
from 50-50.6 Yet, we find that this is not the case. As anticipation of the results, what
we observe instead is that winning probabilities are about 60-40 in favor of the player
who plays with the white pieces in the first and in all the odd games of the match.
As will be discussed in more detail later, playing with the white pieces is advanta-
geous to win a chess game. This means that, ceteris paribus, the player playing with the
white pieces in the odd games of the match is randomly allocated a greater likelihood
to be leading during the course of the match. Conversely, his opponent, who plays with
the white pieces in the even games of the match, is more likely to be lagging. Hence,
this natural experiment shares the same basic design used recently in the literature to
6In Section 3 we qualify this statement.
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study the relevance of emotional or psychological states in understanding the behavior
of subjects performing non-cognitive tasks in competitive environments. In particular,
Genakos and Pagliero (2012), Pope and Schweitzer (2011), Apesteguia and Palacios-
Huerta (2010), and Genakos, Pagliero, and Garbi (2015) provide strong evidence for
these effects from weightlifting, golf, penalty kicks in soccer, and diving competitions,
respectively. Our study, therefore, extends exisiting research to the area of cognitive
performance in a competitive environment using the same type of randomly determined
asymmetry in emotional states. With respect to the term “emotional states,” Sokol-
Hessner et al (2009) document how loss aversion is a basic hedonic property of our
reaction to losing. In particular, they combine physiological measurements of arousal
and various cognitive strategies to study how differences in arousal to losses relative to
gains correlates with behavioral loss aversion. It is in this sense that we refer throughout
the paper to the random determination of the order of play (the advantage of playing
with the white pieces in the even games) as effectively randomizing emotional states.7
Finally, it seems appropriate to quote a reflection by Osborne and Rubinstein (1994,
p.6) who were the first to identify the research potential of this specific natural set-
ting (chess) to contribute to our understanding of bounded rationality, including the
relationship between cognitive abilities and behavioral effects (italics added):
“When we talk in real life about games we often focus on the asymmetry between
individuals in their abilities. For example, some players may have a clearer perception
of a situation or have a greater ability to analyze it. These differences, which are so
critical in real life, are missing from game theory in its current form. To illustrate the
consequences of this fact, consider the game of chess. In an actual play of chess the
players may differ in their knowledge of the legal moves and in their analytical abilities.
In contrast, when chess is modeled using current game theory it is assumed that the
players’ knowledge of the rules is perfect and their ability to analyze it ideal. Results
we prove [...] imply that chess is a trivial game for “rational” players: an algorithm
exists that can be used to “solve” the game. This algorithm defines a pair of strategies,
one for each player, that leads to an “equilibrium” outcome with the property that a
player who follows this strategy can be sure that the outcome will be at least as good as
the equilibrium outcome no matter what strategy the other player uses. The existence
of such strategies (first proven by Zermelo (1913)) suggests that chess is uninteresting
because it has only one possible outcome. Nevertheless, chess remains a very popular
and interesting game. Its equilibrium outcome is yet to be calculated; currently it is
impossible to do so using the algorithm. Even if White, for example, is shown one day
7Other references with neurological and physiological evidence that support our use of these terms
include Bechara et al. (1997), Schaefer et al. (2002), Ochsner et al. (2004), and Kerner et al. (2006).
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to have a winning strategy, it may not be possible for a human being to implement
that strategy. Thus, while the abstract model of chess allows us to deduce a significant
fact about the game, at the same time it omits the most important determinant of the
outcome of an actual play of chess: the players’ “abilities.” Modeling asymmetries in
abilities and in perceptions of a situation by different players is a fascinating challenge
for future research, which models of “bounded rationality” have begun to tackle.”
To the best of our knowledge, no previous research has taken the opportunity that
this setting provides to study these aspects.
3 Rational and Behavioral Models of a Match
A chess match is a nontrivial setting in which it is not possible to attribute differences
in performance, if any, without first understanding what is the role that rational and
behavioral elements may play in behavior. So, what is the role that these elements
play in a chess match? Under what conditions may we conclude that psychological or
rational effects have an impact on cognitive performance? In this section we provide a
formal analysis to address these questions.
Recall that the randomly determined color of pieces generates one very specific type
of asymmetry between the players: as playing with white pieces confers a strategic
advantage in a chess game,8 the random draw of colors means that players who begin
playing with the white pieces are randomly given a greater opportunity to lead in the
match and, conversely, those with the black pieces are given a greater opportunity to
lag in the match.
We start with a canonical model (Subsection 3.1), which we then develop to include
rational and psychological elements (Subsections 3.2 and 3.3). For the sake of exposition,
we use chess terminology. Needless to say, the analysis also applies to other settings
with repeated interactions in which the stage games have three possible outcomes.
3.1 The Canonical Model
Consider a chess game between two identical players: white and black. Let W > 0
denote the probability that the player with the white pieces (white) wins and L > 0
8In the sample of matches we will study, 30 percent of the games were won by the players with the
white pieces and 17 percent by the player with the black pieces; the rest are draws. In the more than
165,000 chess games in the Chessbase dataset presented in the next section, which includes our data
from chess matches, the win rates are 28 and 18 percent, respectively, when both players have an ELO
rating above 2,500 (typically Grandmasters, the highest title a player can achieve).
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the probability that the player with the black pieces (black) wins. We assume that
W + L < 1, so 1−W −L > 0 is the probability that the game ends in a draw. In chess
it is strategically advantageous to play with the white pieces, which means that W > L.
As just noted, empirically W is about 0.28-0.30 and L about 0.17-0.18.
A canonical chess match consists of T chess games, where T is an even number.
In game 1, Player 1 plays with the white pieces and Player 2 with the black ones. In
subsequent games the colors are alternated. Since a chess match is a constant-sum
game, then, without loss of generality, we can assume that the utilities for each of the
players are 1 if winning the match, 0 if losing, and 0.5 if they tie.9
Since both players are completely symmetric in a canonical chess match, the following
result is straightforward:
Proposition 3.1. The expected payoff in a canonical chess match is 0.5 for both players.
3.2 Rational Models
Preliminaries. A chess match is a dynamic tournament in which, in principle, play-
ers may not have the same effort conditions during the match and/or may choose the
amount of risk to take depending on their leading/lagging state in the score. Typi-
cally, in the empirical studies in the literature that study non-cognitive performance
in competitions, the task is effortless and risk either does not play any role (when the
outcome of the task is binary, e.g., score or not) or can be cleanly taken into account. 10
In a chess game, however, strategic risk taking matters since there are three possible
outcomes (either player may win the game or they may tie).
In what follows we try to understand the role that effort and risk may play in our
empirical setting:
a. Effort. With respect to the idea that players can exert different effort during
the match depending on the score, the design by FIDE of the typical chess match
intends to ensure that all the games in the match are played under identical conditions
and, in particular, that players have sufficient time to fully recover from the effort
they exert: no more than one game is played each day and rest days are scattered
during the duration of the match to ensure that players can play every single game in
perfect physical conditions and can always exert the maximum cognitive effort. This
9Since both players are identical, we can represent their preferences by the same utility functions.
Then, without loss of generality, these utilities can be normalized so that the utility of a win is 1 and
the utility of a loss is 0. Hence, since we are in a constant-sum game, the utility of a tie has to be 0 .5.
10See, for example, Genakos and Pagliero (2012) and Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010).
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characteristic allows us to abstract from modelling effort as a choice variable. 11
b. Risk. A more important consideration is the fact that players may choose the
risk they take during the match depending on the score. The role of strategic risk
taking is, in general, not trivial and requires a formal analysis, which we provide below.
Interestingly, the analysis shows that strategic risk taking is not neutral: it favors the
player who starts the match playing with the black pieces. That is, absent behavioral
effects this player should win significantly more often a chess match. The basic intuition
for this result is the following. Lagging in the score may induce a player to choose to
lower his expected performance by taking risks that he would otherwise not take in
exchange for a greater probability to win a game and catch up in the score. Hence,
the possibility of taking more risks and having more variable outcomes (e.g., increasing
the chance of both winning and losing in exchange for a lower chance of tying) is an
instrument at the disposal of the lagging player. This instrument, if anything, could
help counteract any potential disadvantages given by the random determination of the
colors. Clearly, the leading player can also tailor the risk he takes to the advantage that
he has in the match and play more conservative strategies. However, no matter how
conservative the leading player is, the lagging player can always drive the game into a
win-lose lottery where the probability of winning is greater than if he had not chosen
to take the additional risk.
This insight is not new; in fact, it is well known in the literature on the strategic
choice of risk (variance and covariance) in dynamic competitive situations. 12 Yet, as
indicated earlier, it has been studied neither in the game theoretical literature on re-
peated interactions nor in the literature on multi-battle contests. In terms of empirical
implications, it means that if the player who starts the match playing with the black
pieces exhibits significantly greater cognitive performance, then empirical evidence from
average treatment effects alone will not allow us to conclude whether behavioral effects
are present in the data. The reason being that his greater winning frequency may simply
11In related settings studied in the literature, effort is a choice variable. There is a body of literature
that studies multi-battle contests in which players compete in a sequence of single component contests
(battles) choosing effort (e.g., monetary expenditures). Importantly, in these settings, and different
from ours, effort determines the size of the prize both in the component battles and in the overall
battle. See for example Harris and Vickers (1987) in the context of a patent race, and Klumpp and
Polborn’s (2006) study of the dynamics of candidate performance and campaign expenditures in the
US presidential primaries. Konrad and Kovenock (2009) characterize the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium in these multi-battle contests when effort is a choice variable, but strategic risk taking is
absent. Interestingly, in their setting, having effort as a choice variable is neutral in that it does not
cause any deviation from 50-50 in the probability of winning the contest. For a survey of the theory of
contests in sports see Szymanski (2003).
12See, for instance, Cabral (2002, 2003), Hvide (2002) and Hvide and Krinstiansen (2003).
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reflect the advantage that strategic risk taking confers.
Before formalizing the role of strategic risk taking we discuss an assumption specific
to the empirical setting.
Assumption. In a typical chess game, the first mover advantage gives the player
with the white pieces at least as much control over how “risky” the game will be. This is
because he has at least as much control over the type of “opening” that will be played.
Although there is not much discussion about this assumption in the chess community,
chess is too complex to provide a theoretical foundation for it. We incorporate this
asymmetry in the “technology” for risk taking in the models and provide two pieces of
support for this assumption:
1. Experts’ Assessment. It is not difficult to find statements from world elite players
that support this assumption. For instance, former world champion Vladimir Kramnik
(June 2011, interviewed after the Candidates Matches to qualify to challenge the reigning
world champion, italics added) indicates: “My white games were all pretty complicated,
tense and full of fight. I am responsible for my white games, and I was always trying to
find a way to fight with white, even if I did not get an advantage. But with black it is
very difficult and incredibly risky to start avoiding drawish lines from the very beginning,
because it can easily just cost you a point in a very stupid way [...] get a bad position,
lose the game, lose the match and feel like an idiot? I didn’t do it [...]. It is a difficult
decision which can easily backfire at this level.”
2. Empirical Evidence. We know that because of strategic risk taking the expected
performance of a player in a game should decrease when he is lagging. As a result, the
assumption on the asymmetric technology for risk taking has the additional implication
that it should decrease by a greater amount when the black player is lagging than when
the white player is lagging. The empirical evidence is consistent with this implication:
when lagging the observed decrease in performance is more than twice as large for black
(about 16 percent) than for white (about 7 percent).13
13The expected performance is simply the number of points a player is expected to achieve in
the current game. That is, his expected score can be computed as 1 × “prob. of winning” + 0.5 ×
“prob. of a draw” + 0 × “prob. of losing”. The table below shows the expected score for each player
when lagging and when the match is tied for matches between players with ratings above 2500 (typically
Grandmasters). Similar results are found for all other subsets we have examined, and for the whole
sample of matches. Performance loss denotes the relative change in the expected score.
ELO ratings above 2500
Expected score of white Expected score of black
Match tied 0.553 Match tied 0.447
White lagging 0.515 Black lagging 0.374
Performance loss 6.9% Performance loss 16.3%
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Models. We now present two models which incorporate into the canonical model
the assumption that the “technology” for risk-return trade-off is at least as good for the
player with the white pieces than for his opponent. Importantly, we will find that this
assumption is sufficient (but not necessary) to show that the possibility of choosing the
risk that is taken favors the player starting with the black pieces. The reason is that the
main element driving the result is not this assumption but the “informational rent” of
the player starting with the black pieces: Since risk taking increases the probability of
winning a game at the cost of increasing by a larger amount the probability of losing, risk
taking is especially useful for a lagging player. The intuition is again straightforward.
Take a two-game match and suppose that the player starting with black has lost the
first game. Then, in the second game, a draw is as bad as a loss and therefore he only
cares about increasing his probability of winning. He will surely take risks regardless of
whether or not white has more control over risk. Of course, the same would be true for
the player starting with the white pieces if he had lost the first game, but this effect
is less important since the probability of winning with the white pieces is greater than
with the black pieces.
Model R1: Only White Controls Risk
In this first model we assume that white has all the control over the risk involved in
the game, an assumption that we relax in the following model by assuming that black
also has some control over the risk. By taking a risky action, white can increase his
probability of winning by Rw > 0 and his probability of losing by αRw, with α > 1.
14
Recall that in game 1 Player 1 plays with the white pieces and Player 2 with the black
ones. Since white has all control over risk, Player 2 can guarantee for himself an expected
payoff of at least 0.5 by mimicking in the even games the choices made by Player 1 in
the odd games. We show below that Player 2 can in fact do strictly better. Intuitively,
this is because he can benefit from the fact that he has more information when he has
to make his choices concerning optimal risk-taking.
Proposition 3.2. Consider a match consisting of T = 2 games in Model R1. Then,
optimal play in this match leads to a higher expected payoff for Player 2 than for Player 1.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Corollary 1. In a match consisting of T games in Model R1, the expected payoff for
Player 2 is greater than the expected payoff for Player 1.
14Of course, we assume that W + L + (1 + α)Rw < 1.
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Proof: See Appendix A.
The proofs of these results show that the empirical fact that W > L is not necessary.
Since Player 2 is the only one who can choose risk in Period 2, he is also the first one
who can make an informed choice of risk. This “informational rent” is enough to give
him an edge in the match.
We show in the next model that if both players have some control over risk in both
periods, then the fact that W > L is crucial to prove that Player 2 has an advantage.
Model R2: Both Players Control Risk
In a given game both players can increase the probability of winning by taking a
risky action. A risky action by white increases his probability of winning by Rw > 0
and his probability of losing by αRw, with α > 1. Similarly, a risky action by black
increases his probability of winning by Rb ≥ 0 and his probability of losing by αRb.15
Under the assumption that white has at least as much control over how “risky” a chess
game is, we have Rw ≥ Rb. We find below that this is a sufficient condition to obtain
that Player 2 has an advantage in a match. Further, this condition is not necessary.
Note that, since W > L and α > 1, the following two conditions are satisfied when
Rw ≥ Rb:
C1: Rb <
W
L
Rw.
C2: Rb < Rw +
Rw(α−1)(1−W−Rb)
L+Rw
.
We show next that these two conditions suffice to give Player 2 an advantage in a
two-game match. The intuition is that, although both players can control risk in both
periods, the possibility of choosing a risky strategy is particularly valuable when a player
is lagging in the score. Since W > L, Player 2 is more likely to be lagging in the score
than Player 1 and, hence, he is the one more likely to benefit from optimal risk taking
in Period 2.
Proposition 3.3. Consider a match with T = 2 games in Model R2. When C1 and C2
are satisfied, optimal play leads to a higher expected payoff for Player 2. A sufficient
condition for this result is that Rw ≥ Rb.
15Obviously, it has to be the case that W + Rw + αRb + L + Rb + αRw ≤ 1.
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Proof: See Appendix A.
This generalizes Proposition 2.16 Although Rw ≥ Rb is sufficient for this result, it
is clear from conditions C1 and C2 that it is not necessary as Player 2 will also have
an advantage even in some cases where Rw < Rb. In other words, stating the result
in terms of these two conditions is stronger than stating it in terms of Rw ≥ and Rb.
And again the intuition is that the “informational rent” that Player 2 always has is
independent of which player has greater control over risk in a game.
3.3 Behavioral Models
We next extend the canonical and rational models to incorporate psychological elements.
We try to adopt the simplest possible formulation that is both tractable and consistent
with empirical evidence. As discussed earlier, empirical evidence from non-cognitive
tasks supports the hypothesis that a gain/loss or leading/lagging asymmetry relative
to a reference point has an impact on performance. This is the first aspect that we
want to capture in the model. The literature offers various ways to formalize this
idea. In particular, preferences with loss-aversion relative to a reference point have
been widely adopted in both theoretical and empirical research, rationalizing a host of
anomalies from labor supply, to consumer behavior and finance. The incorporation of
these ingredients into economic theory dates back at least to Kahneman and Tversky
(1979), and much of the early literature equated the reference point with an exogenous
or history-dependent status quo. Recently, Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) suggested
an alternative approach of forward-looking, endogenous reference-point formation based
on expectations. Here we take the simplest possible version and simply assume that two
identical subjects perceive an even score in the match as their reference point and that
their performance is a function of whether they are leading or lagging in the score. As
will be clear below, other formulations are definitely possible. Yet, this one is tractable,
proves convenient from a formal perspective, and captures the basic insights of more
general formulations.17
16Obviously, when Rb = 0, conditions C1 and C2 are trivially satisfied and this result reduces to
Proposition 3.2 in Model R1.
17Current research in economic theory is trying to understand how to empirically distinguish among
different models of reference dependence that share similar formulations but specify different processes
of reference point formation (see, e.g., see Masatliogu and Raymond (2014)). This is not at all trivial. In
fact, providing separation between competing accounts of reference-dependence is empirically difficult,
often pushing the limits of experimental feasibility. See Sprenger (2015) for a novel experimental
design that successfully accomplish this separation. Distinguishing among competing models, however,
is beyond what can be studied in our empirical setting.
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Let k denote the difference between the number of games won and the number of
games lost by the player who plays with the white pieces; that is, k is positive when
he is leading and negative when he is lagging. Recall that the natural experiment
randomizes the identity of the players more likely to be leading and lagging in the score.
Now, the probability that the player with the white pieces wins the current game is
W + e(k) and the probability that he loses is L − e(k), where e(∙) is an increasing
function that captures the behavioral element with e(0) = 0 . Winning generates elation
whereas losing generates disappointment and discouragement. As we are in a zero-
sum game, e(∙) captures this asymmetry and its impact on relative performance. We
further assume that − e(−1) ≥ e(1), which means that the decrease in performance
when lagging by one game for the player with the white pieces is at least as large as the
increase in performance when leading by one game.18 Clearly, e(∙) must also be such
that W + e(k) ≤ 1, and L − e(k) ≥ 0. This formulation captures in a parsimonious
manner the basic ingredient of the loss aversion effect typically considered in more
general specifications in the literature.19 Players have no control over this effect; in
other words it is not under volitional control.20
Model B1: No Strategic Risk Taking
We next prove that when risk taking is not a choice variable Player 1 has an ad-
vantage. For intuition note that, since W > L, Player 2 is more likely to start game 2
lagging in the score (k = −1) than leading in the score (k = 1), and that the properties
of e(∙) imply that this effect will negatively affect his performance in game 2.
Proposition 3.4. Consider a match consisting of T = 2 in Model B1. If e(−1) < 0,
then the expected payoff of Player 1 is higher than the expected payoff of Player 2.
Proof: See Appendix A.
18“Disappointment,” “elation” and “discouragement” are terms used both in the economics litera-
ture (e.g., Gill and Prowse (2012) and Abeler et al (2011) in contexts of effort provision) and in the
psychology literature.
19Golman and Rao (2014) provide supporting evidence for these ingredients from basketball. Using
data from hundreds of thousands of plays, they find that among NBA players: (1) expectations do
not influence the reference point, which appears remarkably stable around zero, and (2) when trailing,
players perform worse on focus-intensive effortless tasks (they shoot free throws with lower accuracy),
a finding also in Mertel (2011). Also in the context of basketball but at the level of teams, which may
exert effort and choose risk, Berger and Pope (2011) find evidence where lagging by a little at half time
can lead to winning at the end of the match.
20An intriguing theoretical innovation is the possibility of incorporating a conscious choice of antici-
pation (how to mentally prepare) as a mechanism through which reference points are formed as beliefs
(see Sarver, 2014).
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The proof of this result shows that the edge that the psychological effect gives to
Player 1 increases with the edge he has in the first game, that is with W − L: Playing
the first game with the white pieces makes his opponent more likely to lag in the match
and thus more likely to be subject to the decrease in performance caused by e(−1). We
show below that the result extends to matches of arbitrary length.
Proposition 3.5. Consider a match consisting of T games in Model B1. If e(−1) < 0,
then the expected payoff for Player 1 is greater than the expected payoff for Player 2.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Model B2: Strategic Risk Taking
Thus far we have seen that strategic risk taking favors Player 2 (Section 3.2) while
psychological effects e(∙) favor Player 1. Next, we study the model in which both effects
are considered simultaneously and the extent to which they can be compared. We do
this under the assumptions on risk of Model R1 (white has all control over risk), not
only because the resulting model is more tractable but also because it is the one where
the effect of strategic risk taking is strongest.21 To further facilitate the comparison,
we fix a special form for the e(∙) function.22 We assume that there is λ > 0 such that
e(k) is essentially of the form kλ; that is, the magnitude of the effect is proportional
to k.23 This also means that − e(−k) = e(k). So the leading/lagging state impacts
performance in the same manner for the two types of pieces.
The following result, whose proof builds upon the proof of Proposition 3.5, says that
the behavioral effect can be larger than the effects of strategic risk taking.
Proposition 3.6. Consider a match consisting of T games in Model B2 with λ > 0. If
Rw is small enough relative to λ, then the expected payoff for Player 1 is greater than
the expected payoff for Player 2 (for all α ≥ 1).
21Of course, a similar analysis is possible under the assumptions of Model R2.
22We have studied several variations of the function e(∙), obtaining comparable results.
23Formally, in order to ensure that we have well-defined probabilities for the three possible outcomes
of a chess game we need that, for all k, W + Rw + e(k) ≤ 1, L − e(k) ≥ 0, and L + αRw + e(k) ≤ 1.
So, we simply let M = min{1−W −Rw, L, 1− L− αRw} and define
e(k) =
{
min{kλ,M} if k ≥ 0
−min{−kλ,M} if k < 0.
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Proof: See Appendix A.
It may also be interesting to obtain some sufficient condition for the above result
connecting λ and Rw. This is what we do next.
Proposition 3.7. Consider a match consisting of T = 2 games with 0 < λ < M . Then,
if λ > WRw
W−L , optimal play in this match leads to a higher expected payoff for Player 1
than for Player 2.
Proof: See Appendix A.
It is interesting to note that the parameter α does not play any role in this condition
on λ,24 and that this condition is quite intuitive.25 Finally, we note that a thorough
numerical analysis suggests that a similar condition holds for matches of arbitrary length
T .26
Summary. We conclude from the theoretical analysis that rational effects operate in
favor of Player 2 whereas behavioral effects suggested by the existing literature operate
in favor of Player 1. Thus, evidence from average treatment effects will be consistent
with the hypothesis that psychological effects are a relevant determinant of cognitive
performance if the player starting with the white pieces (Player 1) significantly out-
performs his opponent (Player 2). Likewise, the evidence will support the hypothesis
that rational strategic risk taking is a significant determinant of observed performance
if the player starting with the white pieces (Player 1) is outperformed by his opponent
(Player 2).
24The reason is that this condition is computed when Player 1 plays safe in game 1 and recall that
α > 1 implies that Player 2 only plays risky when he is lagging. In such a case, Player 2 is indifferent
between a draw and a loss so he only cares about his probability of winning, which increases by Rw
regardless of the value of α.
25The greater Rw is, the greater the psychological effect has to be to overcome the effect of strategic
risk taking. And as W − L represents how much more likely Player 1 is to be leading rather than
lagging after game one, then, greater values of W − L mean that the psychological effect will come
into play more often in favor of Player 1 in game two, and this leads to smaller threshold values on λ.
Another sufficient condition on λ can also be obtained by studying his expected payoff from playing
risky.
26It seems natural that the same condition that is sufficient to give Player 1 an advantage in a
two-game match is sufficient for longer matches as well. However, we have not been able to obtain an
analytic expression. The main challenge comes from the fact that in a match of length T the best reply
of a player (whether to play risky or safe) at each possible situation depends on all the parameters
of the game and also on the current score. Yet, to study this conjecture, we have simulated matches
for over more than a million random parameter configurations constrained by λ > WRwW−L (and for each
parameter configuration we solved for match lengths going from T = 2 to T = 32). In each and every
one of these instances, the expected payoff of Player 1 was greater than the expected payoff of Player 2.
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4 Data
The dataset comes from Chessbase’s megabases, which are the most comprehensive
databases in chess. They have detailed data on about 5 million games beginning in the
XVIth century. We study all the matches during the period 1970-2010, namely about
511 matches with about 3,000 chess games. We select these four decades since 1970
is the year when FIDE adopted the ELO rating system; that is, the year after which
records on the cognitive ability of the players at this task, as measured by this rating,
exist. The dataset is comprehensive as it includes all matches classified as such in
Chessbase’s megabases that exactly fit the randomized experiment described in Section
2.27
A valuable characteristic of the data set is that we have a reliable measure of the
cognitive ability of the players performing the task. Players have a rating according
to the ELO rating method, and the difference between two players’ ELO ratings is
functionally related to an estimate of the probability that one of the players will beat
the other should they play a chess game. More precisely, a player’s ELO rating is
represented by a number that increases or decreases based upon the outcome of games
between rated players. After every game, the winning player takes points from the
losing player, and this number of points depends monotonically on the rating difference
between the two players.28 Nowadays, the top 10 players in the world typically have an
ELO rating between 2,770 and 2,850 points, the top 100 players a rating above 2,650,
and players with a rating above 2,500 points are professionals who have the title of
Grandmaster, which is the highest title that a player can achieve.
Table 1 provides a description of the dataset and some pretreatment characteristics
which, as expected, are not significantly different across the players. This is also con-
firmed when the dataset is split into different subsamples (see Table B1 in Appendix
B).
[Table 1]
27As such, it does not include matches played versus a computer, matches without a perfect alter-
nation of colors, or matches where there is an incumbent who wins in case of a tie (such as various
current and past World Championship final matches). We also exclude two observations of matches in
which various games were played in the same day without the standard resting time between games.
28In case of a draw, the lower rated player also gains a few points from the higher rated player. For a
more detailed explanation of the ELO rating system we refer to Chapter B.02 in the FIDE Handbook
(https://www.fide.com/fide/handbook.html).
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5 Empirical Evidence
5.1 Evidence for Professionals
In order to have an initial sense of the data, we begin by studying all matches where
players have an ELO rating above 2,500 and the rating difference between the players is
no greater than 100 points. We choose this subset because these players are professionals,
the stakes in the matches they play are high, and matches with a difference in ratings
above 100 ELO points are quite uneven, as the strong player is expected to win with
a very high probability regardless of other factors. This sample concerns 197 matches
with a total of 1,317 chess games.
As one would expect from the random treatment, the average quality of the players
that begin with the white pieces (mean = 2,620.1, std. deviation = 62.1) and the average
quality of the players that begin with the black pieces (mean = 2,616.7, std. deviation =
57.4) are statistically identical (p-value = 0.56). If the order had no effect on the outcome
of a match, the proportions of matches won by the two players should be statistically
identical. Yet, we find that there is a significant and quantitatively important difference:
the player who begins playing the first game with the white pieces wins 57.4 percent of
the time, a proportion that is statistically different from 50 percent at the five percent
significance level (p-value = 0.046).29 The analysis in the previous section indicates
that this average treatment effect arising from the randomly determined difference in
the order of play is consistent with the hypothesis that psychological effects resulting
from the consequences of the playing order are a significant determinant of cognitive
performance.30
In Figure 1 we split these data into “Elite” versus “Non-Elite” matches, and in
matches for the World Championship versus other matches. “Elite” matches are those
played by players with an ELO rating above 2,600, and World Championship matches
29Using Graham’s (2015) TL estimator to correct for the non-independence caused by having certain
players playing more than one match in the sample the p-value is 0.037. This estimator is also used in
the regression specifications. Further, in the subset of matches where players played in just one match,
where non-independence is obviously not an issue, the proportions are maintained around 60-40.
30In the raw data, when the first game ends in a draw the winning probability (frequency) becomes
higher for the player who started with the black pieces (45-55). Also, the likelihood of winning the
match is higher when white wins the first game (87-13) and when black wins the first game (17-83).
However, once the match begins and the first game is played we do not have the effect of randomization
anymore as subsequent play is endogenous to the outcome of the first game. A random effects dynamic
panel data model with lagged dependent variables and unobserved heterogeneity would then be needed
to obtain unbiased and consistent estimates of the different correlation effects of the final score with
interim scores.
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are matches belonging to the World Championship cycles organized by FIDE. These
are two intuitive ways of selecting arguably more important matches, where the stakes
are even higher, and players are more skilled and have a deeper preparation.
[Figure 1 here]
We find that for Elite matches winning frequencies are 62-38 and for World Cham-
pionship matches 67-33. These frequencies are statistically different from 50-50 at stan-
dard significance levels (for Elite matches p-value = 0.021, for World Championship
matches p-value = 0.005). Thus, the magnitude and significance of the effects increase
when considering Elite and World Championship matches.
5.2 Regression Results
This subsection first reports the complete set of results for the three different samples
of professionals studied earlier (professionals with a rating above 2,500, and Elite and
World Championship matches) with the same maximum rating difference. In each case
we consider two different specifications.
[Table 2 here]
Not surprisingly, the results confirm the previous evidence: the effect of starting the
match playing with the white pieces is positive and strongly significant in each of the
regressions, typically with p-values below 0.05 and even below 0.01. Further, the impact
becomes greater in magnitude and statistically more significant in the more important
matches (Elite and World Championship). As expected, the difference in ELO ratings
between the players also has a positive and significant impact in the probability of
winning a match in every regression specification.
In Table 3 we report the main results. In the first two columns we consider all the
matches in Chessbase’s megabase regardless of the ELO level of the players and with
no limit on the difference in ELO ratings. These are the most general specifications. In
the next three columns we report the most complete specification for three minimum
ELO levels as well (corresponding with 2,200, 2,400 and 2,600 ratings).
[Table 3 here]
The results continue to confirm the strongly significant effect of starting the match
playing with the white pieces. Similarly, and not surprisingly, the difference in ELO
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ratings continues to have a positive and significant impact on the probability of winning
a match. The same results arise in columns three to five for the various minimum
ELO levels considered. A central result is that they are particularly strong, in terms
of size and significance, at the highest level.31 Together with the evidence from Elite
and World Championship matches in the previous table, it indicates that the biases are
strongest in the most important (and mentally more stressful) matches. Thus, the clear
patterns we observe are consistent with the interpretation that increased stakes amplify
the differences in cognitive performance associated with the effect we document. 32
Finally, we also note that a small percentage of matches (not included in the sample)
ended up tied. The same findings are obtained in the corresponding ordered probit
regressions with the three outcomes (win, loss, tie) when these matches are included.
These results are reported in Appendix B.
5.3 Additional Testable Implication
We next take further advantage of the opportunity provided by the fact that we have
a reliable measure of the cognitive ability of the players to study the following testable
prediction: given the undoubted role that other factors may play in determining the
winner of a chess match, it should be the case that the effects of beginning with the
white or black pieces significantly contribute to determining the outcome of a match
only in relatively symmetric matches. That is, in any of the formal models considered
in the previous section, the more similar in cognitive strength the two players are, the
greater the effects should be, and differences in the ability of the players should attenuate
the differences in performance observed in the natural experiment. In other words, the
order of colors should presumably tip the balance only when other factors are relatively
similar, and this effect should steadily decrease as players are more different in their
cognitive skills. We study this implication in Figure 2 which reports the evidence for
the sample of matches studied in Subsection 5.1.
[Figure 2 here]
Matches are sorted by the difference in ELO ratings between the players, and then
divided into quartiles from more similar players (quartile 1) to less similar players (quar-
31In the regression specifications of Tables 2 and 3, the interaction of “ELO difference” with “Starting
with White Pieces” is not significant and has no significant impact on the coefficient estimates of the
rest of variables.
32Consistent with these findings, Goldman and Rao (2014) find that the accuracy of NBA players
in focus-intensive effortless “free throws” is lower not only when trailing but also in the NBA playoffs
and when the games are nationally televised.
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tile 4). We find that the p-values of the proportions Chi-square tests are 0.02 (quartile
1), 0.44 (quartile 2), 0.88 (quartile 3) and 0.88 (quartile 4). Further, reassuringly, when
ELO differences are larger than 100 (not reported in the figure), there is no significant
effect (p-value=0.7423). Thus consistent with the basic hypothesis, only in matches be-
tween players of similar cognitive ability are there significant differences in performance
between the players. And as predicted the size of the effect increases when players
become more similar in cognitive skills.33
6 Concluding Remarks
Understanding all aspects of “competition” is central to economics, and understanding
the effects of cognitive and noncognitive abilities is important not only in economics
but in areas ranging from cognitive psychology to neuroscience. Competitive situations
that involve cognitive performance are widespread in labor markets, education, and
organizations, including test taking, student competition in schools, competition for
promotion in firms, and numerous other settings. This paper contributes to the the-
oretical and empirical literature on dynamic competitive situations, which shows that
incorporating behavioral elements arising from the state of the competition may offer
significant insights about human behavior that otherwise would be lost. First, we have
developed rational and behavioral models that incorporate this ingredient. Second, in
terms of empirics, the literature has found that these emotional states are important
for explaining the behavior of professional subjects performing non-cognitive tasks in
sports such as golf, soccer, basketball and weightlifting. Our findings show that they
are also important in competitive cognitive tasks.34
We hope these results will stimulate further research. We have studied the impact of
randomly allocated emotional differences on cognitive decision making in a competitive
situation involving high stakes, sophisticated players, and elaborate decision processes.
Previous research has found that individuals with higher cognitive ability tend to exhibit
fewer and less extreme cognitive biases that may lead to suboptimal behavior. Thus,
an open question for future research is the extent to which these effects are important
in other parts of the distribution of cognitive abilities, in tasks and settings with lower
33This result may also contribute to explaining the previous findings that the effect is stronger for Elite
and World Championship matches. These are matches where players have a deeper preparation and
hence, conditional on their rating, their deeper preparation may make them more similar in cognitive
skills during their matches.
34In schools, for instance, providing students with relative performance information (indicative of
the state of the competition) has an impact on future performance (Azmat and Iriberri (2010)).
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stakes, and even among the poor (Mani et al, 2013). This may have relevant public
policy implications.
A second open question concerns models of reference points. Current developments
in the theoretical and experimental literature are trying to understand how to distinguish
among various models of reference dependence, and how these models relate to other
models of non-expected utility theory which rely on different psychological intuitions. 35
This represents an important and necessary contribution for continued progress. The
results in this paper suggest that the study of cognitive performance, both in individual
decision-making and in game theoretical situations, may represent a fruitful area for
future research to help us learn about processes of reference point formation.
35See Masatliogu and Raymond (2014), Sprenger (2015), and Sarver (2014).
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A Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. We solve the game backwards. We start in Period 2, where Player 2 plays with
the white pieces. If Player 2 lost the first game, he can only get a positive payoff by
winning the second game, so he chooses the risky action. If the first game was a draw
then, since the utility for a tie in the match is 0.5, Player 2 plays safe. That is, he does
not want to transfer probability from the probability of drawing to the probability of
winning if this entails transferring an even greater probability from the probability of
drawing to the probability of losing (recall that α > 1). If Player 2 won the first game
he just wants to minimize the probability of losing the second game, so he plays safe.
We look now at Period 1. We find that the expected payoff for Player 1 is less than
0.5 regardless of his action. The expected payoff for Player 1 if he chooses the safe
action is:
W
(
1− W + Rw
2
)
+ (1−W − L)(L + 1−W − L
2
) +
L2
2
,
and this reduces to 1
2
(1 − WRw), which is less than 0.5. His expected payoff when
choosing the risky action is:
(W + Rw)(1− W + Rw
2
) +
(
1−W − L− (1 + α)Rw
)
(L +
1−W − L
2
) +
(L + αRw)L
2
,
and this reduces to 1
2
(
1−R2w −Rw(α(1−W )− (1−W − L))
)
, which is also less than
0.5 (recall that α > 1).
Proof of Corollary 1.
Proof. We already know that Player 2 can get an expected payoff of 0 .5 simply by
mimicking the actions of Player 1 in the previous game. Assume now that he always
follows the mimicking strategy except in game T in the following case: if the score is
tied at the end of game T − 2, then he plays risky in game T if he lost game T − 1 and
plays safe otherwise. Proposition 3.2 implies that this is a profitable deviation from the
mimicking strategy and, therefore, its expected payoff for Player 2 is greater than 0 .5.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. We solve the game backwards starting with Period 2. We distinguish three cases.
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Case 1. Suppose Player 1 won game 1. Then, in game 2, Player 1 is indifferent
between a victory and a draw, so he plays safe. Player 2 is indifferent between a loss
and a draw, so he plays risky. The expected utility for Player 1 in this case is:
u1 =
1
2
(W + Rw) + 1(1− (W + Rw)).
Case 2. Suppose Player 1 lost game 1. Following the above reasoning, Player 1 plays
risky in game 2 and Player 2 plays safe. The expected utility for Player 1 in this case
is:
u2 =
1
2
(L + Rb).
Case 3. Suppose that game 1 was a draw. Then, in game 2, since the utility
for a tie in the match is 0.5, both players play safe. That is, they do not want to
transfer probability from the probability of drawing to the probability of winning if it
entails transferring an even greater probability from the probability of drawing to the
probability of losing (recall that α > 1). The expected utility for Player 1 in this case
is:
u3 = 1L +
1
2
(1− (W + L)).
We move now to Period 1. We can compute the expected utilities for each combina-
tion of strategy profiles of the players in period 1. Let uSR denote the expected utility
of Player 1 when he plays safe and Player 2 plays risky and similarly the other utilities.
Then:
uSS = Wu1 + Lu2 + (1−W − L)u3
uRR = (W + Rw + αRb)u1 + (L + αRw + Rb)u2
+(1− (W + L + (1 + α)(Rw + Rb)))u3
uRS = (W + Rw)u1 + (L + αRw)u2 + (1− ((W + Rw) + (L + αRw)))u3
uSR = (W + αRb)u1 + (L + Rb)u2 + (1− ((W + αRb) + (L + Rb)))u3
We now show that, given Period 2’s optimal behavior, Player 2 can ensure for himself
an expected utility higher than 0.5 by playing safe in period 1. Then, whatever Player 2’s
optimal choice is in period 1, it also gives him an expected payoff higher than 0 .5. We
compute the utilities of Player 1 with his two actions in period 1 when Player 2 is
playing safe. First, uSS reduces to
1
2
(1 + RbL−RwW ), which is less than 0.5 when C1
is satisfied. Second, uRS reduces to
uRS =
1
2
(
1 + L(Rb − Rw)− R2w + Rw(1 + (α− 1)W + α(−1 + Rb))
)
,
29
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
which after some algebra can be rewritten as:
uRS =
1
2
(
1− (L + Rw)(Rw − Rb)− Rw((α− 1)(1−W − Rb))
)
,
which is less than 0.5 when C2 is satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Proof. The expected payoff of Player 1 is given by
W (1− W + e(−1)
2
) + (1−W − L)(L + 1−W − L
2
) + L
L− e(1)
2
,
which reduces to 1
2
+ − e(−1)
2
W − e(1)
2
L ≥ 1
2
+ − e(−1)
2
(W −L) where the inequality follows
from the assumption − e(−1) ≥ e(1). Since W − L > 0 and − e(−1) > 0, the expected
payoff of Player 1 is greater than 0.5. Note that rather than assuming − e(−1) ≥ e(1),
we could instead have made the weaker assumption that − e(−1)W > e(1)L.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Proof. A T -game match is composed of many two-game mini-matches. Suppose that
a two-game mini-match is about to start and let k denote the difference between the
number of games won and the number of games lost by Player 1. We denote by P1(k, s)
the probability that Player 1 is leading/lagging by k + s games after the mini-match.
Following the above notation, P1(0, s) denotes the probability that Player 1 is lead-
ing/lagging by s games after the first two games of the match. Then, P1(0, 2) = W (L+
e(1)), P1(0, 1) = (1−W−L)(W +L), P1(0, 0) = (1−W−L)2+L(L−e(1)+W (W−e(1)),
P1(0,−1) = (1 − W − L)(W + L), and P1(0,−2) = L(W + e(1)). In particular,
P1(0, 2)− P1(0,−2) = (W − L) e(1) > 0 and P1(0, 1) = P1(0,−1).
The above probabilities show that Player 1 has a higher probability of being better-
off than Player 2 after the first two games. What we show next it is also easier for
Player 1 to make a comeback than it is for Player 2. More precisely, we show that, for
each k ∈ N and each s ∈ {2, 1, 0,−1,−2}, ∑2s P1(k, s) ≥∑2s P1(−k,−s). In words, the
probability that Player 1 improves his score by at least s points when the current score
is k is greater than the probability that it is for Player 2 to improve by at least s points
when the score is −k. Establishing this result independently of k and s, combined with
P1(0, 2)− P1(0,−2) > 0 and P1(0, 1) = P1(0,−1), delivers the result.
The difference P1(k, 2)−P1(−k,−2) reduces to (W−L)(e(k+1)−e(k)) which is non-
negative, since e(∙) is an increasing function. Now, P1(k, 1) = P1(−k,−1) and, hence,
P1(k, 2)+P1(k, 1)−P1(−k,−2)−P1(−k,−1) reduces again to (W −L)(e(k+1)−e(k)).
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P1(k, 0)−P1(−k, 0) = (W −L)(2 e(k)− e(k + 1)− e(k− 1) and so P1(k, 2) + P1(k, 1) +
P1(k, 0)−P1(−k,−2)−P1(−k,−1)−P1(−k, 0) equals (W −L)(e(k)−e(k−1)) which is
also non-negative. The next inequality follows from the fact that P1(k,−1) = P1(−k, 1)
and the final one is immediate since
∑2
s=−2 P1(k, s) =
∑2
s=−2 P1(−k,−s) = 1.
Proof of Proposition 6.
Proof. Note that Model B1 is a particular case of Model B2 in which Rw = 0. We could
now replicate the probabilistic analysis in the proof of Proposition 3.5 and obtain new
expressions for the probabilities computed there. Importantly, all of them would be
continuous in Rw. Therefore, since the case Rw = 0 leads to a strictly greater expected
payoff for Player 1, the same will also be true if Rw is small enough. For the observation
regarding α we just need to note that if a value of Rw works for α = 1, it will also work
for greater α (which means that risk taking is more costly).
Proof of Proposition 7.
Proof. By repeating the arguments in the proof of Proposition 3.2, we can get that the
expected payoff for Player 1 if he chooses the safe action is:
W
(
1− W + Rw − λ
2
)
+ (1−W − L)(L + 1−W − L
2
) +
L(L− λ)
2
.
This reduces to 1
2
(1−WRw + λ(W − L)), which is more than 0.5 if λ > WRwW−L .
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Table 1- Dataset and Pretreatment Characteristics 
 
 
            
 
 
Panel A: Type and Length of Matches 
     
  
Matches Games 
   
  
N N 
   
 
Type of Match 
     
 
World Championship   83  689 
   
 
Non-World Championship 428 2181 
   
 
Elite 133  953 
   
 
Non-Elite 378 1917 
   
       
 
Length of Match 
     
 
Number of rounds < 6 214  658 
   
 
Number of rounds 6-8 203 1231 
   
 
Number of rounds >8   94  981 
   
 
All 511 2870 
   
       
 
Panel B: Pretreatment Characteristics of Players 
    
  
Player 1 Player 2 Difference 
  
 
ELO rating 2507.66 2510.18 -2.52 
  
  
(164.01) (160.78) (105.82) 
  
       
 
Age 30.82 31.52 -0.69 
  
  
(10.83) (11.14) (15.67) 
  
       
 
ELO criterion 0.475 0.524 -0.049 
  
  
(0.493) (0.493) (0.986) 
  
       
 
Age criterion 0.478 0.521 -0.043 
  
  
(0.487) (0.487) (0.973) 
              
  
      Notes: The variables ELO criterion and Age criterion indicate the proportion of times that  
      the player shows a better entry in the criterion, ELO rating and Age respectively, at the 
      time of the match (= 1 if higher, = 0 if lower, = 0.5 if same). Standard deviations in  
       parentheses. 
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Table 2 - Probit Regressions for Winners of a Chess Match 
 
 
 
 
 
Matches with a 
Minimum ELO: 2500 
 
 
Elite Matches 
Minimum ELO: 2600 
 
 
World Championship 
Matches 
 
       
Intercept -0.170 -0.170 -0.300 -0.300 -0.391 -0.390 
 (16.68) (17.58) (23.10) (24.61) (29.27) (31.43) 
       
Starts with white pieces     0.340**    0.340** 0.598*** 0.600*** 0.782*** 0.780*** 
 (0.133) (0.128) (0.190) (0.188) (0.224) (0.228) 
       
Rounds 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.030) (0.030) (0.038) (0.039) 
       
Year 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) 
       
ELO difference      0.012***    0.012***    0.013***    0.013***      0.011***   0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.0028) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
ELO points 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
       
Age difference  -0.006  -0.000  -0.005 
  (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.012) 
       
Age  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.009)  (0.014)  (0.015) 
       
 
Maximum ELO Difference=100    
     
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N (matches) 197 197 100 100 73 73 
Log-Likelihood -234.12 -233.24 -114.35 -114.34 -81.99 -81.82 
Akaike Information Criterion 480.24 482.48 240.69 244.69 175.97 179.63 
 
Notes: *** denotes significant at the 1 percent significance level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 
percent level. The independent variables are the following: “Starts with white pieces” is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the player started playing the first game in the match with the white pieces; “Rounds” is the number 
of rounds in the match; “Year” is the year the match takes place; “ELO difference” is the difference in ELO 
points with respect to the opponent; “Maximum ELO difference” is the maximum ELO difference between the 
players in the sample; “Player’s ELO” is the ELO rating of the player; “Age difference” is the difference in age 
with respect to the opponent, and “Age” is the age of the player. All the variables involving the rating and the 
age of the players are at the time the match takes place. The number of matches in which the difference in ELO 
levels is above 100 is 6 (World Championships), 16 (Elite, ELO>2600), 39 (ELO>2500), 68 (ELO>2400), 127 
(ELO>2200), and 142 (complete sample). The number of tied matches are 4 (World Championships), 17 (Elite, 
ELO>2600), 33 (ELO>2500), 49 (ELO>2400), 67 (ELO>2200), and 73 (complete sample). Standard errors in 
parentheses (Graham (2015)). 
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Table 3 - Probit Regressions for Winners of a Chess Match 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Complete Sample 
 
 
                   Minimum ELO 
 
     2200                 2400 
 
 
 
 
   2600 
       
Intercept -0.101 -0.100 -0.120 -0.130 -0.280  
 (11.50) (11.66) (12.18) (14.62) (24.32)  
       
Starts with white pieces 0.202** 0.200** 0.240** 0.260** 0.570***  
 (0.090) (0.090) (0.096) (0.109) (0.188)  
       
Rounds -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.039)  
       
Year -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012)  
       
ELO difference 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.015***  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)  
       
ELO points 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)  
       
Age difference  -0.011** -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.001  
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010)  
       
Age  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014)  
       
 
Maximum ELO Difference   
 
None None None None None  
N (matches) 438 438 414 315 116  
Log-Likelihood -465.62 -459.23 -427.65 -327.54 -116.24  
Akaike Information Criterion 943.24 934.45 871.29 671.08 248.48  
 
Notes: *** denotes significant at the 1 percent significance level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 
percent level. The independent variables are the following: “Starts with white pieces” is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the player started playing the first game in the match with the white pieces; “Rounds” is the number 
of rounds in the match; “Year” is the year the match takes place; “ELO difference” is the difference in ELO 
points with respect to the opponent; “Maximum ELO difference” is the maximum ELO difference between the 
players in the sample; “Player’s ELO” is the ELO rating of the player; “Age difference” is the difference in age 
with respect to the opponent, and “Age” is the age of the player. All the variables involving the rating and the 
age of the players are at the time the match takes place. The number of tied matches are 4 (World 
Championships), 17 (Elite, ELO>2600), 33 (ELO>2500), 49 (ELO>2400), and 67 (ELO>2200). Standard errors in 
parentheses (Graham (2015)). 
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Figure 1. The number of matches in each category are reported in parentheses. The p-values of the proportions 
Chi-square tests are 0.04 (All matches), 0.02 (Elite matches), 0.68 (Non-Elite matches), 0.004 (World 
Championship matches) and 0.79 (Non-World Championship matches). 
 
Figure 2. Matches are sorted by the difference in ELO ratings into four intervals (quartiles). The endpoint of the 
first interval is chosen so that it cuts off the lowest 25% of the sorted ELO differences. Similarly, the other 
endpoints cut off the 50%, 75% and 100%, respectively. The intervals are reported below each quartile. The 
number of matches in each quartile is 61, 42, 46 and 48 respectively.  The differences in the number of matches 
across the intervals comes from the discreetness of the ELO ratings, which until the late 1999 moved in 
increments of 5 points. 
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